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Abstract Since its introduction in 2008, blockchain technology has outgrown its use in cryptocurrencies and is now
preparing to revolutionize a multitude of commercial
applications including value and supply chains, business
models, and market structures. This work follows design
science research to guide the implementation of a blockchain-based proof-of-concept prototype that enables the
automated transaction of real-world assets, such as cars,
and provides a valid, transparent, and immutable record of
vehicle history to market participants, authorities, and other
third parties. The contribution of this study to existing
research is threefold: First, it introduces a built-in mechanism to reduce transaction risk resulting from the irreversibility of transactions in blockchain-based systems.
Second, it replaces a trust-based, centralized, and bureaucratic register with a tamper-free and autonomous
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transactional database system that comprises a secure
registration and transaction process. Third, it proposes a
novel approach to mitigate adverse selection effects in
lemon markets by providing a reliable, transparent, and
complete record of each marketable asset’s history. In total,
the findings in this article illustrate the potential of
blockchain-based systems but also highlight technological
shortcomings and challenges for commercial applications,
such as scalability or privacy issues.
Keywords Blockchain  Design science research  Trustfree commercial system  Asymmetric information 
Market for lemons

1 Introduction
The blockchain is frequently referred to as the technological innovation of the twenty-first century, which arguably
possesses the potential to reshape and disrupt a plethora of
economic activities. Since its introduction in 2008 (Nakamoto 2008), the concept of a distributed database that is
governed and maintained without any central authority has
recently outgrown its use as a verification mechanism for
cryptocurrencies and is heading to a broad field of commercial applications. Today, the ‘‘trust machine’’ (Economist 2015) – which basically combines a distributed digital
ledger, a decentralized consensus mechanism, and cryptographic security measures—is preparing to revolutionize
the role of intermediaries and institutions by enabling new
forms of value and supply chains, business models, and
market structures. In consequence, visions of trust-free,
transparent, and secure transaction systems (Beck et al.
2016), decentralized asset management approaches,
autonomous registry systems (Fairfield 2015), and
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immutable event logs announce disruptive changes in
organizational structures and business processes (Glaser
and Bezzenberger 2015).
In this paper, we utilize the use case of the Danish Motor
Register (DMR) to present a new way to record, manage,
and track the status of ownership of physical assets, such as
cars, and develop, implement, and evaluate a blockchainbased transaction system that aims to replace centralized
institutions as trusted third parties. We have chosen Denmark as a technologically advanced nation and a frontrunner in the digitalization of governmental services to
illustrate the benefits of blockchain-based systems with
respect to public registry and transaction systems. In collaboration with the Danish tax authority (SKAT), we
explore the potential of a blockchain-based car register and
illustrate how it might be able to replace traditional trustbased, centralized, and bureaucratic systems.
Within this scope, the contribution of our research is
threefold: First, we introduce a built-in mechanism to
reduce transaction risk associated with the irreversibility of
blockchain transactions (Böhme et al. 2015). Second, we
address the challenges of providing and maintaining a
complete and consistent public record of vehicle history by
replacing a traditional register with a blockchain-based
alternative that includes a secure registration and transaction process. In doing so, we illustrate how to replace a
potentially expensive, trust-based, incomplete, and inconsistent bureaucratic registry with an autonomous and
potentially cost-efficient transaction log. Third, we propose
to mitigate adverse selection effects in used goods or lemon
markets (Akerlof 1970) by providing a reliable, transparent, and complete record of each marketable asset’s history. In addition, our generic software design introduces a
generalized transaction framework, in which the DMR use
case inherits its core functionalities from the high-level
framework. This way, we take practical considerations into
account as the generic system design allows the extensions
to other assets and ensures applicability beyond the use
case of cars.
In accordance with Gregor and Hevner (2013) the
remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2,
we provide an introduction to blockchain-based commercial systems by reviewing recent academic literature,
introduce the use case of the DMR, and discuss the effects
of adverse selection in lemon markets. In addition, we
identify relevant gaps in existing blockchain research and
formulate three research questions accordingly. Section 3
introduces the applied design science approach and highlights our guidelines as well as our main contributions.
After this, Sect. 4 describes our blockchain-based IT artifact, including its software architecture and the prototype’s
market design. Sections 5, 6, 7 evaluate, discuss, and
conclude our results respectively.
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2 Blockchain-based Commercial Systems
This section provides a brief introduction to blockchainbased commercial systems, outlines the DMR use case, and
identifies a research gap at the interdisciplinary intersection
of the fields of information systems and economics. In
consequence, Sect. 2.1 reviews recent literature about
blockchain-based systems, Sect. 2.2 illustrates the use case
of the DMR and its practical challenges, and Sect. 2.3
introduces the problem of adverse selection in lemon
markets, such as the market for used cars.

2.1 Literature Review
The blockchain was first introduced as a mechanism to
prevent double-spending in the peer-to-peer electronic cash
system known as Bitcoin. Based on the underlying idea of
Nakamoto (2008), blockchain protocols provide an
immutable record of transactions by combining a distributed database comprised of chronologically ordered and
cryptographically interconnected blocks of transactions
with a decentralized consensus mechanism and cryptographic security measures (Glaser 2017). The interplay of
these elements impedes the dissemination of corrupted
information and moderates frictions among potentially
conflicting agents without the need for a central governing
institution or authority (Fairfield 2015). In combination
with smart contracts (Szabo 1994), i.e. programs running
on the virtual machine borne by the peer-to-peer network
of blockchain nodes (Buterin 2013; Wood 2017), the
technology has outgrown its origin in cryptocurrencies and
is heading to a variety of commercial applications (Nofer
et al. 2017).
With its potential for disintermediation and its capability
to mediate and resolve multilateral conflicts, the blockchain’s disruptive impact is not limited to the financial
service industry (Wörner et al. 2016) but rather encourages
discussions about use cases across various industries.
Potential applications include decentralized market and
application platforms, notary services (Wörner et al. 2016),
digital proof of identity and legitimization (Wörner et al.
2016), digital rights management systems (Fujimura et al.
2015), validated, immutable, and consistent registries
(Fairfield 2015; Glaser 2017; Xu et al. 2017), and transaction systems that track the ownership of (digital) assets
(Fairfield 2015; Beck et al. 2016).
From a technological perspective, the consensus mechanism enables the creation of new blocks and allows agents
to autonomously agree on the correct order of transactions
and a shared system state at any given point in time (Buterin 2013) by decentralized timestamping (Gipp et al.
2015). However, to implement an effective mediation
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mechanism, the applied consensus scheme needs to be
tailored to the specific use case at hand:
In public and anonymous scenarios, the creation of new
blocks has to incur a sufficient amount of costs of effort, in
order to prevent the dissemination of corrupted information. As a result, this increased cost of deception reduces
the presence of conflicting information throughout the
system (Lamport et al. 1982), mitigating the risk of Sybil
attacks (Dinger and Hartenstein 2006; Douceur 2002). In
practice, mechanisms such as proof-of-work (Nakamoto
2008; Anderson et al. 2016), proof-of-stake (Anderson
et al. 2016; Kiayias et al. 2016), or proof-of-space (Ateniese et al. 2014; Dziembowski et al. 2015) artificially
create costs for adding new blocks, and thus discourage
potentially malicious nodes from tampering with the data.
On the downside, they also create a tremendous amount of
overhead costs, for instance in the form of electricity
(O’Dwyer and Malone 2014), and thus impede the system’s efficiency.
In private networks with known participants on the other
hand, there is no threat of Sybil attacks and expensive
conflict resolution is not necessary. Therefore, identitybased identification schemes (Bellare et al. 2009), such as
hash-based user authentication (Li et al. 2015), provide
more efficient alternatives that also allow for different
levels of privacy.
In summary, blockchain technology offers a distributed
software architecture (Xu et al. 2016) that possesses no
single point of failure or requirement for centralized governance. As a result, it enables autonomous, transparent,
secure, and tamper-free transactional databases (Glaser
2017), reduces the complexity of writing contracts
(Davidson et al. 2016), facilitates cost-efficient micro
transactions (Beck et al. 2016), and allows for the emergence of novel organizational forms and business models
(Glaser and Bezzenberger 2015).
Within this scope, Greiner and Hui (2015) introduce the
notion of trust-free systems and propose to address trust
issues in peer-to-peer systems by eliminating the need for
trust. Consequently, costly trust-building mechanisms, such
as trusted intermediaries, governing institutions, or interpersonal trust are replaced by cryptographic protocols,
decentralized consensus algorithms, and smart contracts
(Greiner and Hui 2015; Glaser 2017). Beck et al. (2016)
apply this notion to the perspective of blockchain-based
commercial systems and develop a proof-of-concept prototype of a transaction system, which ‘‘operates trust-free
by completing transactions on the basis of self-enforcing
rules’’ (Beck et al. 2016). The concept of being trust-free,
however, remains ambiguous, since one could argue that
trust will not be replaced but shifts from central institutions
or market authorities towards algorithms (Lustig and Nardi
2015), which eventually govern the agents’ interactions
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(Maurer et al. 2013). Besides this ambiguity, understanding the technical protocols and implementations of distributed ledgers, decentralized consensus systems, and
decentralized applications remains complex (Glaser and
Bezzenberger 2015) and researchers and practitioners still
struggle to grasp their full potential.
Aside from usability concerns, blockchain-based systems still face a variety of technological challenges as well.
First, due to their nature as a transaction-based systems,
smart contract applications cannot trigger themselves, but
rather require some form of external intervention to execute (Glaser 2017). Second, as an emergent technology
blockchain-based systems still face a variety of technical
limitations, such as capacity, latency, and query issues
(Glaser 2017; Beck et al. 2016; Wörner et al. 2016). Third,
there are some drawbacks associated with the technical
structure of blockchain protocols, such as the threat of 51%
attacks (Nakamoto 2008; Böhme et al. 2015), increased
costs related to the deployed consensus mechanism (Brenig
et al. 2016; Beck et al. 2016; O’Dwyer and Malone 2014),
privacy concerns (Kosba et al. 2015; Böhme et al. 2015),
and transaction risk (Böhme et al. 2015).
Transaction risk relates to the irreversibility of transactions conducted via blockchain systems. In combination with
decentralized timestamping and the interconnection of
blocks, the irreversibility of transactions ensures the correct
order of transactions and is essential to protect users from
double-spending attempts and the dissemination of corrupted data by malicious agents. The resulting data
immutability enables the transacting parties to trust the
correctness of the stored transactional history. In the case of
erroneous transactions or fraud, the irreversible character of
current protocols, such as Bitcoin or Ethereum, remains an
unsolved issue and poses a prohibitive obstacle for the
transaction of valuable real-world assets, such as cars and
securities. All things being equal, this leads users to prefer
alternative systems that offer mechanisms to undo faulty
transactions or to reclaim the transacted asset by force.
Overall, we take up the notion of cryptographic transaction systems introduced by Beck et al. (2016), extend the
concept to the on-chain transmission of real-world assets,
and formulate the following first research question:
Research Question 1: How can we decrease the
transaction risk resulting from the irreversibility of
blockchain transactions and still provide a valid
transaction log?
2.2 Use Case – The Life Cycle of a Car in Denmark
In the course of its product life cycle, a vehicle and its
owner(s) are involved in a variety of administrative and
bureaucratic processes. These processes include a variety
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of steps, such as a car’s registration with the motor register,
the payment of levies and taxes, repairs, modifications,
inspections, and interactions with loan, leasing, or insurance firms. One of the most important and complicated
steps is the transfer of ownership after a trade.
With Denmark being a small country, SKAT owns and
oversees most of these administrative and bureaucratic
processes and provides the related governmental services.
More specifically, the DMR operates an IT system that
handles the bureaucratic processes involved in vehicle
transfers and provides a trusted record of ownership and
vehicle-specific information throughout the vehicle’s life
cycle. As a result, the DMR database serves as a repository
for all inputs and outputs from various stakeholders, such
as owners, dealerships, importers, and scrap dealers, as
well as government agencies, such as transport authorities,
police departments, SKAT themselves, and other third
parties, such as insurance companies, banks, or leasing
firms.
The following steps and Fig. 1 illustrate a vehicles life
cycle in detail and highlight the involvement of SKAT, the
DMR, and other stakeholders:
•

•

Import and initial registration Since there are no
domestic car manufacturers in Denmark, all vehicles
have to be acquired from foreign producers. Imported
vehicles are registered at the DMR upon arrival and the
importer has to pay levies and taxes to SKAT.
Allocation After the registration, the vehicles are
transferred to dealerships, which allocate them to their
new owners. As the status of ownership changes, the

•

•

•

•

new owner as well as insurance information need to be
reported to SKAT and stored in the DMR. Only if all
requirements are met, SKAT issues a vehicle registration certificate and grants a road approval.
Maintenance During its life cycle, a vehicle experiences a variety of maintenance procedures, such as
automobile inspections, repairs, or rebuilds. To ensure
road safety and to maintain a correct record of vehicle
information, the DMR records these maintenance
activities and any other modifications.
Transfer of ownership When a current owner wants to
sell his or her vehicle and a buyer is found, the
interacting parties need to settle their trade by simultaneously exchanging the vehicle and the negotiated
payment amount. To minimize fraud risk, it is crucial
that the DMR provides a complete and valid record on
the vehicle’s history and its characteristics.
De- and reregistration Following the transfer of
ownership, the vehicle needs to be reregistered with
SKAT and the DMR. Only if a vehicle is de- and
reregistered correctly, taxes and levies are paid, and the
transfer of ownership is recorded at the DMR, SKAT
issues a new registration certificate legitimizing the
new status of ownership and granting road approval.
Scrapping Eventually, a vehicle is worn-out or damaged and is scrapped. As a result, the owner receives a
scrapping certificate and the DMR deregisters the
vehicle.

Across these steps, SKAT is involved at several points
and faces individual challenges at each integration point,

Fig. 1 The life cycle of a car in Denmark, related process steps, and stakeholder involvement (SKAT 2016)
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the transfer of ownership being the most crucial one. In
addition, the integration of third party services, such as
financial or insurance services, and updating and maintaining the centralized DMR database requires a significant
bureaucratic and organizational effort. As a result, the
increasing size of the centralized DMR database leads to an
increase in complexity, an increase in hardware, maintenance, and conversion costs, and a decrease in performance
(Connolly and Begg 2015; Elmasri and Navathe 2015).
Research Question 2: To which extend can a
blockchain-based system address the challenges of
operating a registry system for cars, such as the
DMR, by providing a valid, consistent, and transparent public record of transactions?
2.3 Adverse Selection in the Market for Lemons
Adverse selection describes a situation in which interacting
parties attach value to the quality of a transacted object but
at the same time possess different levels of information
about it. One of the best-known examples for a market with
adverse selection effects is Akerlof’s Market for Lemons
(Akerlof 1970), where used cars of differing quality are
traded between buyers and sellers.
In order to dismantle this asymmetric distribution of
information, potential buyers use heuristic approaches to
assess the quality of their prospective purchase and try to
infer the cars’ characteristics from statistical estimators
based on prior experiences, markets trading similar goods,
or price signals provided by sellers (Wolinsky 1983).
Despite their efforts, however, the heuristic’s accuracy
decreases in bi- or multilateral market setups and the
buyers’ knowledge about the true value of a car often
remains opaque and a residual uncertainty about quality
cannot be resolved (Genesove 1993).
As a result, equilibrium prices reflect the average quality
of all cars in the market (Wilson 1980) and good and bad
vehicles sell at the same price, while only sellers know
their true characteristics. In this pooling equilibrium, the
sellers of low-quality cars (i.e. lemons) earn informational
rents equal to the difference between the market price and
the cars’ true values, and thus have an incentive to enter the
market. The owners of high-quality cars on the other hand
would earn negative rents as their vehicles’ true values are
greater than the equilibrium price, and thus withdraw form
the market. Eventually, Gresham’s Law comes into effect
and the lemons drive out high-quality cars (Akerlof 1970).
In a continuous world, different levels of quality create a
cascading effect as lower quality cars continuously drive
out the marginally better ones until no demand or supply is
left and the market collapses.
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Reality, however, is less extreme and studies such as
Bond (1982), Hendel and Lizzeri (1999), or Peterson and
Schneider (2014) show that markets for used cars never
shut down completely and that the traded volume remains
substantial despite the presence of information
asymmetries.
One explanation for these findings is the development of
counteracting institutions (Akerlof 1970; Bond 1982;
Genesove 1993), which aim to ensure a minimum level of
quality. These institutions include the provision of guarantees, licensing and certification, or the introduction of
brand names. In addition, in a long-term relationship with
repeated transactions reputation-based mechanisms can
function as a disciplining device (Genesove 1993).
Another explanation is the impact of efficient sorting
between drivers who prefer different levels of quality
(Hendel et al. 2005). However, the resulting self-selection
effect only holds for non-functional parts of cars, such as a
vehicle’s exterior condition, and Peterson and Schneider
(2014) find evidence that adverse selection effects prevail
for vital parts, such as the engine or the transmission.
As a third solution, Tirole (2012) proposes governmental interventions that aim to support sellers with the
strongest legacy assets and at the same time cleans the
market of its weakest assets.
The fourth and final explanation simply describes a
situation, in which the buyers are able to acquire enough
information to approximate the cars quality sufficiently in
order to overcome the adverse selection problem (Bond
1982).
Despite their limited efficacy, all of these counteraction
measures are costly, and thus might impede a market’s
efficiency beyond a socially optimal level (Bond 1982).
The evidence of Gavazza et al. (2014) supports this notion
and indicates a negative effect of transaction costs related
to information asymmetries on transaction volumes, allocation, and the welfare of lower-valuation households.
Similarly, Peterson and Schneider (2014) show that
adverse selection effects have a negative impact on trading
volume and overall quality in the US secondary market for
cars.
In consequence, we follow Pagano and Jappelli (1993),
Jappelli and Pagano (2002), Djankov et al. (2007), Karapetyan and Stacescu (2014), who identify a positive impact
of the disclosure of privately held information on market
efficiency and trading volume, and introduce a blockchainbased transaction system, that aims to resolve adverse
selection by sharing previously private information. As a
distributed, publicly available, consensually agreed, and
secured ledger, the blockchain facilitates the disclosure of
information and impedes the provision of intentionally
corrupted information. The resulting transactional database
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provides a valid and transparent record of each vehicles
history to all market participants – the less informed buyers
and the well-informed sellers likewise – improving the
ability of an uninformed buyer to approximate a car’s true
quality and value. From an administrative perspective, the
transaction system assumes the task of tracking changes of
ownership and vehicle characteristics, improving the
accuracy and transparency of the database at any given
point in time. Overall, we propose to utilize the blockchain
as an alternative to current institutions and a novel mechanism to publicly disclose vehicle information thereby
reducing adverse selection effects in the market for used
cars (Lewis 2011).
Research Question 3: To which extent can a
blockchain-based transaction system provide a reliable, valid, and consistent record of transactions, that
reduces the impact of quality uncertainty in a lemon
market?

3 Methodology: Design Science Approach
To guide the creation, evaluation, and presentation of our
prototype, we utilize the design science research (DSR)
approach proposed by Hevner et al. (2004) and follow their
guidelines in the process of developing our blockchainbased transaction system. Table 1 summarizes the mapping
of our research against the DSR guidelines of Hevner et al.
(2004).
The resulting IT artifact is a proof-of-concept prototype
that aims to replace a traditional registry system with a
trust-free, decentralized, and automated alternative with a
built-in mechanism to prevent unwanted transactions.
Utilizing the blockchain’s core features, it furthermore
provides a resilient, transparent, and valid database for
multiple parties, such as buyers and sellers of cars, government agencies, and other third parties that reduces
information asymmetries by sharing previously private
information.
In order to ensure the efficacy and efficiency of our
artifact, we perform a detailed requirement analysis based
on the use case of the DMR and continuously reevaluate
the system within each iteration of the building phase
(March and Smith 1995). Overall, we contribute to existing
research of blockchain-based commercial systems by
extending the knowledge on the development of a blockchain-based IT artifact, offering a new approach to address
inefficiencies in public sector registries (Fairfield 2015). In
addition, we go beyond known concepts and propose a
novel solution to adverse selection effects by transacting
assets in a trust-free setup without a central authority or
institution.
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4 A Blockchain-based Motor Register
This section presents the design and implementation of our
blockchain-based motor register. Section 4.1 outlines the
design decisions leading to Ethereum as the blockchain
protocol of choice and Sects. 4.2 and 4.3 describe the
application design and its implementation respectively.
4.1 Blockchain Design Decisions
Based on the blockchain design decisions (Xu et al.
2016, 2017) discussed in Table 2, our proof-of-concept
prototype utilizes the Ethereum framework introduced by
Buterin (2013) and Wood (2017) as its underlying
infrastructure.
Ethereum is a decentralized application platform that
provides a quasi-turing-complete programming language
enabling applications based on smart contracts. Running on
a blockchain-borne virtual machine (Buterin 2013; Wood
2017), these decentralized applications enable the creation
of trust-free systems that establish consensual agreements
among multiple interacting agents. Within this scope,
Ethereum allows users to create and deploy programs on a
shared global infrastructure that will be automatically
triggered and executed according to the data they receive
(Glaser 2017). Utilizing these capabilities, we can promote
automation through transaction-triggered smart contracts
minimizing bureaucratic and organizational efforts related
to the administration and maintenance of databases and
registries, such as the DMR.
Ethereum furthermore possess the following desirable
features: first, it provides security and resiliency through
the integration of cryptographic hashing algorithms. Second, due to its distributed nature, data inconsistencies are
exposed to the scrutiny of all users and there is no central
point of failure. In addition, the block-based and chained
data structure enables users to traverse through the entire
database and to retrieve past transactions and reconstruct
each vehicles history (Beck et al. 2016). In theory, this
transparency alleviates the adverse selection effects, while
the system’s openness resolves the data inconsistency
issues introduced in Sect. 2.
In total, these features establish the technological environment of our trust-free transaction system that allows
parties with divergent interests and information to move
value and governs the transfer of ownership by generating
a complete, transparent, and secure record of transactions
without a central institution.
4.2 Software Architecture and Market Design
In order to build a powerful framework that meets the
requirements described in Sect. 2, we choose an object-
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Table 1 Mapping of our IT artifact against the DSR guidelines of Hevner et al. (2004)
Guideline

Contribution

Design as an artifact

The outcome of our research is a proof-of-concept prototype that implements a blockchain-based IT artifact with builtin transaction safeguards that allow the correction of errors in the transaction process

Problem relevance

Our research questions respond to the mitigation of transaction risk inherent in blockchain systems (research question
1), the reduction of inefficiencies in public registry systems (research question 2), and the resolution of adverse
selection risks in used goods or lemon markets (research question 3)

Design evaluation

We evaluate and demonstrate the utility, quality, and efficacy of our prototype via structural and functional testing
(Hevner et al. 2004). In addition, we execute our prototype across different scenarios of the DMR use case to test and
illustrate its functionalities

Research contributions

The contribution of our research is threefold: First, we extend the knowledge on blockchain-based commercial systems
and provide a built-in mechanism to mitigate transaction risk (Böhme et al. 2015) by allowing users to cancel
incorrect transactions. Second, we adopt the concept of trust-free economic systems (Beck et al. 2016) to the use case
of the DMR and introduce a novel way to replace trust-based and centralized bureaucratic registries with a trust-free,
potentially cost-efficient, and autonomous transaction system. Third, we alleviate adverse selection effects and
dismantle information asymmetries between buyers and sellers by sharing a transparent, reliable, and complete record
of vehicle history and ownership

Research rigor

To ensure our research’s rigor, we employ well established DSR frameworks, such as Hevner et al. (2004), Gregor and
Hevner (2013), and March and Smith (1995), to guide the creation and construction of our IT artifact. In addition, we
include guidelines specifically designed to support architectural and structural decisions in the development of
blockchain-based systems (Xu et al. 2016; Glaser 2017; Walsh et al. 2016)

Design as a search
process

To discover an effective solution to the introduced research questions, we build on existing literature about blockchainbased transaction systems, such as Beck et al. (2016), Nakamoto (2008), Buterin (2013), or Wood (2017) and
continuously evaluate and adapt (Simon 1996) our IT artifact throughout the development process (March and Smith
1995; Hevner et al. 2004)

Communication of
research

To maximize the potential impact of our research and to present our results to both, technology-oriented and
management-oriented audiences likewise, we structure our work according to Gregor and Hevner (2013) and utilize
the use case of the DMR to illustrate the organizational context for the artifact’s development and application.To
facilitate the understanding of technology-oriented audiences, we provide a detailed description of the prototype’s
software architecture, its implementation logic, its features, and its application context. To support managementoriented audiences, we furthermore discuss the underlying business problems as well as related economic theories.
Eventually, we prove the effectiveness of our solution by discussing potentials and limitations of the prototype as well
as future applications

oriented software engineering approach and structure the
underlying smart contracts hierarchically. To do so, we first
define a generic marketplace structure (as shown in Fig. 2)
that spans a structural framework, while the implementation of the prototype inherits its core functionalities.
The generic design utilizes a two-layer approach that
combines a market platform with individual goods that can
be traded on this platform. Both, the platform and the
traded object are represented by smart contracts, which
implement different methods, functions, and variables. The
marketplace contract functions as an escrow agent that
organizes trading activities and defines the transaction
process. The tradable contract represents the physical asset,
keeps track of its current owner, and allows ownership to
change after a successful trade.
To ensure the marketplace’s extensibility, we and
employ a hierarchical structure with three levels as
depicted in Fig. 2: the Marketplace contract defines the
interface and sets the minimum requirements for methods
and corresponding events to achieve the basic functionalities specified above. The StandardMarketplce

implements these methods and constitutes the basic
implementation of a functional marketplace. The IndexedMarketplace extends the marketplace with a set
of convenience methods that allow the offers on the marketplace to be indexed as iterated through. This way, we
segregate the interface, the core logic, and the convenience
methods, increasing the frameworks robustness, keeping it
adaptable to different use cases and scenarios, and ensuring
the testability of different modules.
In addition, we allow the onTransferOwnership() method of the Tradable contract to be overridden thereby allowing logic to happen during the
transaction process. This way, our market platform allows
the implementation of various background checks before a
car is traded and grants the possibility to abort the trade by
throwing the transaction, if certain conditions, such as an
adequate insurance coverage or sufficient funding, are not
met or one of the transacting parties does not comply to the
previously agreed terms.
To implement the DMR marketplace (Fig. 3) we utilize
the general marketplace structure shown in Fig. 2. The
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Table 2 Blockchain protocol and application design (Xu et al. 2016, 2017)
Blockchain design decisions
Decision 1: Transaction processing rate
In 2015 the DMR conducted a total of 1,757,664 registration operations covering the registration of new vehicles by dealers, SKAT, and
other parties, the de- and reregistration following changes of ownership, registry updates following repairs, inspections, or modifications,
and the deregistration of worn-out vehicles. At the current specification (gas limit per block, average gas cost per transaction), the
Ethereum network is able to process roughly 7–8 vehicle transactions every 30 s, which equals 22,439 transactions per day. In
comparison to the DMR’s average daily transaction load of 4816 operations, the Ethereum framework offers a suitable transaction rate for
the infrequent transaction of cars
Decision 2: Consensus and block selection
To provide a reliable and consistent source of information in a public setup with conflicting agents, we choose a proof-of-work-based
block selection mechanism. This approach moderates conflicting parties and prevents malicious nodes from spreading incorrect or
counterfeited information
Application design decisions
Decision 1: On- and off-chain data storage
In order to balance the required computational power and the level of transparency, we apply a mixed on- and off-chain data storage
model. To ensure a sufficient level of transparency and to enable the verification of transactions on one hand, transactional data (i.e.
registration operations including repairs and automobile inspections) is stored on-chain.Personal details and other information not specific
to the transaction object on the other hand will be stored off-chain in a SKAT database and can be assigned to transactions via hash-based
keys
Decision 2: Public vs. private chain
We choose a public setup to facilitate accessibility, transparency and trustworthiness and to take the existing as well as the potential user
base into account. Different privacy levels are realized through user-specific interfaces, hashing, and on- and off-chain data storage
Decision 3: Single vs. multiple chains
To facilitate data consistency, allow easier chain and permission management, and enable third party integration we select a single chain
setup
Decision 4: Validation oracles
We use external validation oracles, such as SKAT, police departments, transport and road authorities, and other government agencies, as
well as workshops and automobile inspectors, as trusted parties that provide and verify vehicle-specific information
Decision 5: Permissioned vs. permissionless
We plan to integrate our transaction system with other government services, and thus choose a permission-based setup. In consequence,
we require all members to provide some form of governmentally approved authorization, such as a passport or ID number or a registered
corporate ID, to join the network and to conduct transactions

DMR contract extends the IndexedMarketplace with
the business logic relevant for the DMR, such as the ability
to issue vehicles and to keep track of their ownership status
afterwards. To do so, the DMR contract holds a register of
the issued vehicles, their current owners, and respective
license plates. The cars traded on the market are implemented by the Vehicle contract, which extends the
Tradable and supplements properties required for the
registration of vehicles, such as the unique Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) and other vehicle-specific details.
Instead of Ether, which is the cryptocurrency used on
the Ethereum blockchain, we use a token-based representation of traditional fiat currency, such as Danish Kroner, as
means of payment. This way, we are able exclude any
exposure to exchange rate risk. Using Danish Kroner
however requires a third party, such as a central bank, a
commercial bank, or a credit card company, to back or lock
the value of the amount allocated to the buyer’s blockchain
account (Broadbent 2016; Raskin and Yermack 2016). The
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same holds for the seller when he or she wants to extract
his return from the system.
4.3 Prototype
To develop the prototype, we use the holistic deployment
framework (Truffle 2017). Truffle (2017) supports all steps
of the development process including testing and deployment and takes care of boilerplate code needed to use smart
contracts in Ethereum.
To facilitate accessibility, we implement the prototype
as web application that can be accessed via an URI from
any Ethereum enabled browser, such as Mist (2017), or by
manually running a local Ethereum client while accessing
the URI. Figure 4 shows a snapshot of the web application
short before the completion of a transaction. To improve
privacy and increase usability, we provide user-specific
interfaces to different parties interacting with the system,
namely buyers and sellers, government agencies, and third
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Fig. 2 Class diagram
marketplace and tradable

Fig. 3 Class diagram DMR

parties. From a practical perspective, we implement the
interfaces as three different views in the web application: A
car registration view, a register lookup, and a personal
view, from which owned cars can be retrieved, offered, and
traded.

To mitigate transaction risk, we divide the transaction
process into the following four steps and implement two
built-in safeguard mechanisms:
In the first step, we match buyers and sellers and they
negotiate the terms of their trade. To reduce complexity

123

434

B. Notheisen et al.: Trading Real-World Assets on Blockchain, Bus Inf Syst Eng 59(6):425–440 (2017)

Fig. 4 Snapshot of the
prototype’s user interface after
the acceptance and before the
completion of a transaction

and increase system performance, buyer-seller matching
and pricing is not implemented in the prototype. Instead,
buyers and sellers have to find each other and negotiate
terms off-chain in the real world.
In the second step, after they successfully reached an
agreement, the seller can reach out to the buyer through the
marketplace contract and provide an on-chain offer to sell
the car by calling extendOffer(). To do so, he or she
logs into the DMR blockchain system via the web-interface
and sends an offer (extendOffer()) to the potential
buyer by specifying the buyer’s address, i.e. his public key,
and the price. The public key is a hash representing the
buyer’s unique address or account number on the blockchain. In a real-world setup, public keys would be connected to a personal or corporate ID, enabling human
individuals as well as corporate entities to buy and sell
cars. After the seller has initiated the offer, the buyer has
the possibility to either accept it by calling acceptOffer() or to do nothing, i.e. do not accept the offer. In the
case of acceptance, the buyer enters into an escrow
agreement and acceptOffer() checks whether he or
she has a sufficient amount of funds, withdraws the agreed
price from his or her account, deposits it within the market,
and notifies the seller about the acceptance of the offer. In
the second case, the seller can revoke the offer via the
revokeOffer() method. This is the first safeguard to
prevent the provision of offers that differ from the previous
off-chain agreement.
In the third step, the transacting parties meet in person
and exchange the physical good off-chain. The actual
transfer of ownership however, has not taken place, yet. To
conduct this transfer, buyer and seller have to go back onto
the blockchain to complete the transaction by calling
completeTransaction(), releasing the previously
deposited funds to the seller while transferring the ownership of the asset. More specifically, completeTransaction() simultaneously deposits the
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money to the seller’s account and transfers the certificate of
ownership to the buyer. In line with this process, the
vehicle is automatically deregistered and reregistered with
the DMR.
If any problem occurs during the physical meeting, for
instance if the car does not possess the previously advertised qualities, abortTransaction() aborts the
transaction, reimburses the money to the buyer, and cancels
the trade. This is the second safeguard mechanism and
within this fourth and final step, each party has the means
to cancel the transaction and withdraw from the agreement
by calling revokeOffer() and abortTransaction() respectively. Aborting or revoking the transaction
will remove the offer, transfer the funds deposited in the
market back to the buyer, and stop the transfer of ownership. It is important to note, that the actual transfer of
ownership of the asset and the payment comprise the final
step of the two-legged transaction process and eventually
settle the transaction. In both cases, the offer is deleted
afterwards. As a result, both parties have the chance to
abort an unwanted, unintentional, or erroneous transaction
by using the transaction safeguards in the steps two and
four (research question 1).
To illustrate the transaction process in greater detail,
Figs. 5 and 6 depict the sequence of calls for a successful
transaction and the different system states during the
transaction process respectively.
Eventually, the transaction data is immutably stored on
the blockchain and publicly visible enforcing transparency
(research question 3) and at the same time providing a
complete and consistent record of ownership to the transacting parties, as well as SKAT and other relevant stakeholders (research question 2). In combination with the
inherited transparency of the blockchain, our market design
allows for a full view of issued vehicles, their current
owners, as well as their history, and thus facilitates the
reduction of information asymmetries in used car markets.
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Fig. 5 Sequence diagram for a valid transaction

Fig. 6 State diagram for offers on the market

A full version of the implemented prototype is available
on GitHub (https://github.com/cholewa1992/marketplace).

5 Evaluation
The proof-of-concept prototype introduced in Sect. 4
enables an automated and secure registration and transaction process. The system is running on Ethereum and
allows users to invoke the DMR contracts to register (issue) and trade vehicles securely at the DMR marketplace
with any other registered and authorized user. In total, we
provide a solution to all three research question posed in
Sect. 2 and the use case of the DMR highlights the quality,
functionality, completeness, and effectiveness of our IT
artifact. Furthermore, the generalized software architecture
and the market framework introduced in Sect. 4.2 ensure
the utility of our artifact and the provision of value beyond
this specific use case. To evaluate the utility and efficacy of
the prototype in greater detail, we also conduct extensive

structural (White Box) and functional (Black Box) tests
(Hevner et al. 2004).
In the first step, we conduct various unit tests within
JavaScript using the Chai Assertion Library (http://chaijs.
com/) as well as the previously introduced Truffle (2017)
framework. Chai is a JavaScript library that enables the
creation of unit tests and allows for both test setup and
teardown before every test method. Within the structural
testing, we create about 1500 lines of code and conduct 46
unit tests in order to verify the correctness of the marketplace, the tradable, and the token. More specifically, the
tests are designed to evaluate whether each public method
behaves as expected when called with a correct sequence of
inputs (see Fig. 5 for an example of a valid sequence of
calls) and to ensure that the system behaves correctly
during state changes.
In the second step, the scenarios of issuing, buying, and
selling cars within the use case of the DMR serve as a
functional testing environment and illustrate the execution
of the artifact. This way, we aim to detect any failures or
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potential defects in the basic marketplace, the DMR
extension, and the web application. Moreover, the execution of our prototype within the testing scenarios yields
average computational costs equal to 403,000 gas for a
completed transaction. As a block in the our setup accumulates roughly 3,140,000 gas, our system can process up
to 8 transactions per block, assuming the blockchain is only
utilized for the transaction of cars. If we furthermore set the
average latency (i.e. block creation time) to 30 s, our
prototype can handle up to 22,439 transactions per day.
Overall, the prototype addresses the transparency and
data inconsistency issues related to the second hand trading
of cars and illustrates how a blockchain-based transaction
system approach can help to mitigate transaction risk by
introducing escrow-like smart contracts. Furthermore, it
allows third-party integration through observer patterns and
dismantles adverse selection effects and information
asymmetries through the transparent nature of the
blockchain.

6 Discussion
The IT artifact presented in Sect. 4 introduces a novel
approach to administrate registers of real-world assets by
converting registration certificates into unique digital assets
that are managed and maintained by the blockchain. Our
system allows users to register vehicles and to trade registered vehicles securely with any other authorized user.
After a transaction is completed, the traded vehicle is
automatically de- and reregistered with the DMR. As a
result, the registry system provides a complete and correct
record of each car’s transactional history to potential
buyers, government agencies, and other third parties
without any institutional involvement.
The cryptographic interconnection of the data blocks
captures the timely order of past transactions and builds the
foundation for data immutability, which is essential to
ensure data integrity and the validity of the historical
record. In combination with the decentralization of the
consensus authority, the responsibility for the correctness
of the transactional data shifts away from centralized
institutions and towards the stakeholders that are most
affected by asymmetrically distributed information. This
way, our system works as a transparency device that
assures the availability of a complete, valid, and public
record of vehicle history and past ownership changes,
thereby disclosing previously private information. More
specifically, as blockchain transactions are public, potential
buyers of cars are able to access the history of each vehicle,
and thus can improve their assessment of the quality of a
potential purchase. Moreover, no single participant within
the system has to be trusted, because the entries are stored
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based on a consensual agreement and cannot be altered
afterwards.
A clear limitation of this setup is the requirement of
trusted third parties to provide vehicle-specific information
following inspections, repairs, or modifications. This
dependence reintroduces the potential of fraud and offers
the providers of vehicle characteristics the opportunity to
collude with current owners to provide wrong information.
As a result, all actions outside of the transaction process
cannot be fully secure and a residual risk of someone
inserting corrupted information about a vehicle’s characteristics remains.
Although the system is not able to prevent this kind of
fraud, the provision of a tamper-free historical record limits
the fraudsters’ ability to spread false vehicle data. Especially, if there is a certain fraction of honest nodes present
in the system, traversing through the transactional history
enables potential buyers and government agencies to
uncover inconsistencies resulting from frauds, such as
mileage manipulation. These inconsistencies could function as a signal to the buyer that indicates a low quality
vehicle. In addition, the dependence on third party information is limited to vehicle characteristics, while the
record of car ownership remains unaffected, and thus still
provides valuable data for the assessment of quality.
Another way to handle the issue of fraud arises in the
combination of blockchain technology and the Internet of
Things (Zhang and Wen 2017). In context of our use case,
the Internet of Things could relieve trusted third parties
from data provision duties and instead let smart cars
directly report their status and changes thereof to the registry system. This way, data provision could be conducted
in an automated and cryptographically secure manner
(Christidis and Devetsikiotis 2016). A prerequisite for this
approach however, is the technical ability of a vehicle to
determine and report its current status to the blockchain.
From a user perspective, buyers, sellers, and other parties access the system via a web application and transactions are conducted by an algorithmic process specified by
smart contracts. This way, inadequate usage and misunderstandings are lowered to a minimum (Beck et al. 2016),
as the direction of human behavior is governed by the
deployed algorithms. In addition, the web application
provides user-specific views with adequate information
visualizations for each stakeholder facilitating the understanding of the transactional data.
In total, these measures aim to reduce the impact of
adverse selection on market efficiency by dismantling the
asymmetric distribution of information between interacting
parties and minimizing the buyer’s uncertainty about the
characteristics of the traded object.
Besides these use case-specific considerations, blockchain technology and especially the Ethereum framework
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are still emergent technologies, and thus face a number of
technological challenges and limitations.
One main issue of today’s blockchains is scalability.
Depending on the block’s size and block creation intervals,
the actual throughput – measured by the number of conducted transactions per second – is limited and the execution of a transaction can be delayed in times with high
transaction loads (Gervais et al. 2016). In the context of the
DMR, the focus lies on infrequent transactions of a limited
number of vehicles per time interval, and thus scalability
issues do not have a significant impact in this specific use
case. For other use cases however, scalability issues should
be taken into account. If we apply our transaction system to
a larger market setup, such as the German automobile
market, or a different scenario, the limited scalability,
latency issues, and query delays could be a prohibitive
limitation for the adoption of cryptographic transaction
systems. In addition, as the distributed ledger accumulates
conducted transactions it continuously grows over time,
and thus occupies an increasing amount of disk space.
These constraints however, are likely to be of a transient
nature and might be resolved by further improvements of
current and the development of new protocols as blockchain technology matures (Glaser 2017).
Besides technical limitations, public blockchains, such
as the utilized Ethereum framework, also have negative
implications for data privacy. To account for these privacy
concerns, we propose an on- and off-chain storage model
(Xu et al. 2016; Zyskind et al. 2015) for vehicle-specific
and personal information and suggest a hash-based representation of personal and corporate IDs. In addition, market
participants access the database via user-specific interfaces,
and thus receive different information reflecting different
levels of privacy. In combination with the permissioned
blockchain setup, the requirement of an authorized ID
restricts unauthorized access and ensures a minimum level
of data protection.
Due to its prototypical character, the absence of realworld blockchain-based systems other than Bitcoin or other
cryptocurrencies, and the variety of established IT systems,
it remains challenging to assess our system’s actual largescale applicability. However, to provide a general orientation, we provide an abstract and brief distinction between
centralized and distributed databases and point out the
advantages of blockchain technology in the following
paragraphs.
In centralized databases, data is stored at one physical
location and users access the stored data through an
interface. As a result, centralized databases offer easy data
management and maintenance, high performance, and
remain scalable. On the other hand, centralization concentrates costs for setup and maintenance on the database
provider, increases the risk of outages and data losses, and
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requires the users to trust in the governing operator (Elmasri and Navathe 2015; Connolly and Begg 2015).
In distributed databases, the storage and processing units
are kept separately, data is stored at and linked across
multiple locations, and user access the database via a network. To update the nodes and to maintain the database,
data needs to be replicated and duplicated across the network. Central advantages of distributed database systems
are the continuous availability and increased reliability,
easy data recovery, and the flexibility of modular growth.
These advantages however come at the costs of a high level
of complexity, an increased processing overhead, and the
exposure of data integrity to inconsistencies (Elmasri and
Navathe 2015; Connolly and Begg 2015).
Blockchain-based systems combine characteristics of
both systems and offer a resilient distributed database that
ensures data integrity by the consensual agreement of all
nodes, and hence provides a reliable database for multiple
parties. Especially the openness of the transactional history
to the independent scrutiny the interacting parties and other
involved stakeholders minimizes the risk of duplications,
errors, and data inconsistencies. Building a registry system
on a blockchain infrastructure leverages these key properties and meets the main requirements of modern registries,
which include integrity, availability, accessibility, efficient
reading, and immutability (Tran et al. 2017).
To provide an orientation beyond the use case of registries, we furthermore propose three prerequisites that
arguably should be met for blockchain-based systems to
potentially constitute an improvement over traditional
approaches.
First, due to its distributed nature and the integrated
consensus mechanism, blockchain technology provides a
conceptual approach to govern transactions between multiple parties in a public and anonymous setup without the
involvement of a central party. As a result, these systems
possess the ability to moderate interactions between agents
with conflicting interests and motivations. If the conflicting
interests provide a strong intrinsic motivation to participate
in the truth revelation process, we can also discard the idea
of monetary incentives prevalent in cryptocurrencies.
Second, we propose to utilize the blockchain as an
approach to mitigate the exposure to asymmetrically distributed information and perceive and apply it as a toolbox
to facilitate the provision, validation, and dissemination of
a transactional history. Consequently, interactions without
at least one party with private information cannot profit
from an increase in transparency, and thus the benefits of
blockchain-based systems remain limited.
Third, as a distributed system blockchain technology
grants multiple parties writing access to a shared database
without compromising data integrity. For these benefits to
take effect however, use cases need to comprise at least
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two conflicting parties with writing access to the system. If
there is only one party with writing access, there is no need
for consensus and therefore the party with the writing
access simply constitutes the equivalent of a central
authority.
If we map these prerequisites to the use case of the
DMR, we find that all three conditions are met: first, there
is a conflict of interest, which arises between buyers and
sellers, as sellers do not want to reveal their private
information, while buyers want to learn about the true
quality of the cars on the market. In addition, the multilateral market environment and the dynamic transaction
process requires all parties involved to contribute data to
the system.

7 Conclusion
The proof-of-concept prototype developed in this study
aims to replace bureaucratic public registries with an
alternative and illustrates what a blockchain-based transaction system for real-world assets might look like. In
addition, it highlights how the blockchain could function as
a transparency device to mitigate inefficiencies in markets
with imperfect information. From a technological perspective, we provide a platform that governs the transfer of
ownership of used cars and inherently provides a reliable
and complete record of vehicle history to the transacting
parties, government agencies, and other third parties. To
implement the prototype, we apply an object-oriented
software engineering approach that facilitates understanding and allows researchers and practitioners to go beyond
the use case of trading cars and adopt the transaction system to other assets, transactional market setups, and registries systems.
Except for its practical relevance, our study’s contribution to academic research is threefold: First, we introduce a
mechanism to reduce transaction risk resulting from the
irreversibility of blockchain-based transactions. Second,
we replace a trust-based, centralized, and bureaucratic
register with a trust-free and autonomous transactional
database system, which provides a secure registration and
transaction process without the need for a central governing authority. Third, we propose a novel solution concept
to reduce the uncertainty about quality and the resulting
adverse selection effects in lemon markets by providing a
reliable, transparent, and complete record of each asset’s
history.
To reduce complexity and to focus on the research
questions at hand, we furthermore forego the integration of
third party services and official processes, such as automobile inspections or permissions for rebuilds. These and
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other features, however, might be included in future versions as the prototype matures.
Apart from the noted benefits, the applied technology is
still at an early development stage and faces some challenges, such as limited scalability and privacy concerns
that are not yet fully mastered. Also, users need to trust the
correctness and accuracy of the operating algorithms
(Lustig and Nardi 2015) and the provision of information
about the asset by trusted third parties is still an important
prerequisite. This provision however is limited to the
update of vehicle-specific information following inspections, repairs, modifications, or accidents. The transaction
process is conducted fully on-chain, and thus generating
the transactional history does not require any third party
integration. In part, this trust problem might be solved – at
least in the case of cars – by the integration of the Internet
of Things, where sensors provide the required data (Gubbi
et al. 2013).
Irrespective of those concerns, our prototype provides a
valid first step to apply blockchain technology to the field
of public registries and transaction systems and illustrates
the opportunities and challenges of this approach.
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